This paper offers a noncooperative behaviourally-founded solution of the complete information bargaining problem where two impatient individuals wish to divide a unit pie. We formulate the game in continuous time, with unrestricted timing and content of offers. We introduce aspirational equilibrium -a Markovian refinement of subgame perfection where behaviour is governed by the players' aspiration values (expected payoffs).
1 Introduction "The whole creation groans and yearns, desiderating a principle of arbitration . . . " -Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics (1881) , part II, page 46
The classic bargaining problem presents two individuals with the opportunity to share a dollar if they can first agree on a partition. The rebirth of interest in this subject from a modern noncooperative approach dates to Rubinstein (1982) , itself related to Ståhl (1972) . In an infinite-horizon, discrete time alternating offer model with payoff discounting, he found a unique subgame perfect equilibrium yielding immediate agreement.
Let us identify the critical "realistic" elements of the above bargaining problem as: (i) two risk neutral players 1, 2 must divide a unit pie, by concurring on a feasible split; (ii) an agreement means a proposal by one player and an immediate acceptance by the other; (iii) the force for timely resolution is the players' impatience. Like Rubinstein (1982) , we shall ignore the additional (and important) element of incomplete information.
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This paper aims for an entirely behaviourally motivated noncooperative solution of the bargaining problem. Since discrete time forces Rubinstein's unique solution, we shift to continuous time, where there are infinitely many subgame perfect equilibria. View a discrete time model as a restriction of the feasible action space to a subset of continuous time. We instead build the behavioural foundation into the solution concept -aspirational equilibrium (AE). In this Markovian refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium, players' behaviour is governed by their aspiration values, or expected payoffs in the game.
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The Intuitive Structure of Aspirational Equilibria. To give a flavour of this refinement, consider an AE without immediate agreement. As strategies depend on expected payoffs alone and not on time, delay owes solely to the players' randomization. With strict time preference, there are rents from ending this bargaining hiatus. And since any player is indifferent about proposing, only the opponent strictly benefits from this offer. In other words, any delay implies that the players are locked in a war of attrition: Each strictly prefers that his counterpart and not they stop the clock and propose. To summarize, there is an endogenous 'proposee' advantage, as receiving an offer makes one better off.
Next consider what transpires when some player, say Mr. 1, finally tenders an offer to Mr. 2. The latter might accept it with probability one. If so, game over. Assume not. An agreement brings us to the Pareto frontier, and is therefore efficient, while rejection incurs further delay, and is clearly inefficient. Since Mr. 2 weakly prefers to reject, Mr. 1 must be 1 There are essentially two types of such papers: There may be multiple rational 'types' of bargainers, with one or both players uncertain about the other's type. Seminal papers here are Rubinstein (1985) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) . Second, one or both players may be uncertain about their opponent's sanity, as in §8.8 in Myerson (1991) , or Abreu and Gul (2000) ; this strain involves bluffing. Incomplete information has not really played a critical role in the pre-1970 history of bargaining theory. The focus has been on (incredible) threats, concessions, and relative bargaining power.
2 Note crucially that our usage of "aspiration" critically differs from a usage in the literature -that of a "reference point" against which gains and losses are compared (see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994) ). For us, an aspiration is a rational hope or expectation, and not merely an arbitrary benchmark.
disappointed by this outcome, suffering a strict payoff loss if Mr. 2 declines. Altogether, this yields three desirable and realistic features: (i) wars of attrition explain negotiation lags; (ii) all serious offers are concessions; and finally, (iii) some offers may be turned down, whereupon the proposer is strictly disappointed.
An AE specifies exogenously-given aspiration levels for the players -the initial state of a Markov process. The moment Mr. 1 offers x, Mr. 2's aspiration value jumps to this new level x. Afterwards, the concession that is offered may yet be rejected. This leads to a Markov and martingale stochastic process on the space of possible pairs of discounted aspiration levels. We use this process to provide (in Theorem 4 and its corollary) a simple lower bound on the duration of bargaining based upon observed alternating offers. We show that less generous offers foretell a shorter elapse time between offers.
Contrast with Temporal Monopoly. Harsanyi (1956) observed: "As is well-known, ordinary economic theory is unable to predict the terms on which agreements tend to be reached in cases of . . . bilateral monopoly. Only on the basis of additional assumptions does the theory of games furnish a determinate solution." Rubinstein's alternating offer bargaining model converted the intractable bilateral monopoly into a sequence of temporal monopolies: Agreement is seen as the outcome of a process in which individuals in turn are exogenously given the right to ask the other party to accept an offer, or to burn some of the pie by declining (given discrete time). The offerer is then at a strategic advantage, for he can then speak and his counterpart cannot -exactly opposite to our AE.
Temporal monopoly in no way precludes endogenous timing. In a key literature strain, Perry and Reny (1993) , Sakovics (1993) , and Stahl (1993) have also endogenized the timing in this framework. They posit continuous time bargaining games where players have tiny 'waiting' and 'reaction' times after offers. This temporal monopoly setting yields very small monopoly rents, and an accordingly small proposer advantage. Consequently, the normative predictions of our model do not obtain -wars of attrition and strict concessions. Since their results intuitively obtain for random but boundedly positive mean waiting times after offers, at first blush one might presume that our AE are merely special cases. But our timing is truly unrestricted -and to the player with an aspiration level approaching its highest level, offers must be tendered arbitrarily quickly (Theorem 3) .
The distinction between a proposer and proposee advantage yields a striking contrast between the models. We ask the natural question: What happens if player 1 becomes more impatient? In the temporal monopoly framework, this increases player 2's temporal advantage, and forces both players to propose pie splits more favourable to player 2. In our aspirational framework, we first must discern a way of posing the question, since there are a multitude of equilibria. Like Perry and Reny (1993) , we can ask what happens to the set of equilibria. There is a natural bijection between AE's between the two worlds where player 1 is more and less impatient. Provided player 2 offers more rapidly, all incentive conditions are restored at the current aspiration levels. With this mapping, we can see that the final outcome splits in the AE's with a more impatient player 1 place player 2 more often in the strategically disadvantageous offering role. We show in Theorem 5 that this raises the expected ultimate pie share of player 1.
Experimental Support. The importance of aspirations in decision-making has long been established in the psychology literature ( (Siegel 1957 ) is a very early citation). More intriguing, its significance in bargaining has also been investigated in laboratory tests. Siegel and Fouraker (1960) studied a simple buyer-seller bargaining game. The project goal was to investigate the role of differential information on the bargaining split, seeing whether the better informed party did better. But among the "interesting implications", they conclude that "the basis of both the bargainer's 'expectancy' and, at least partially, of his 'bargaining strength' may very well be his level of aspiration" (p. 60). While the authors expected the 50-50 equal split under complete information, their experiments showed how aspirations served as an anchor on the nature of the bids made, and explored how the exchange of offers affected these aspirations. A key role played by offers here -to ratchet up the opponent's aspiration level -was observed in a specific experiment (pp. 80-81), as was the intertemporal non-monotonicity of a player's offer (pp. 77-90).
Outline. Section 2 develops an extensive form with which we may formally speak of subgame perfect equilibria. This is essential, because in section 3, we then craft our aspirational refinement of subgame perfection. Its properties explored in section 4, and sensitivity analysis is performed in section 5. Our proof of this result is a key technical contribution of this paper, as it yields comparative statics on the expected final absorbing state of a Markov process, as the initial state changes. Purely technical proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The Continuous Time Bargaining Model
A. Overview. Two players i ∈ {1, 2} (often denoted i, j) must split a unit pie. The players are impatient, discounting future payoffs by possibly different positive interest rates. The players' outside options are each zero. All parameters are common knowledge. Bargaining transpires in real time on [0, ∞) . At a time of his choosing, either player may propose a pie split. Proposals must lie on the Pareto frontier where pie shares sum to one -and so may be summarized by the share x ∈ [0, 1] offered to the other party. Offers are 'exploding', implying no future commitment: they must be immediately either accepted or rejected. The game ends following an acceptance.
We now formally introduce the model and the notion of subgame perfection. In so doing, there are two main problems we must tackle. First, is the possibility of simultaneous offers and immediate counteroffers. For this, we introduce a notion of vector time thereby nuancing between the simultaneous and the instantaneous. Second, and more delicate, the existence of a well-defined outcome path h σ from a given strategy profile σ is problematic. For since the continuum is not well-ordered (there is not first time before or after a given moment), there need not be an initial historical cause to attribute any current action.
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Our approach to handle this problem is to develop a richer notion of an action space, and maintain a standard extensive form.
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In our approach every outcome path of the extensive form is countably discrete. This concept will better reflect the fact that a strategy must be a plan of action. That is, it must dictate what happens now given the past history.
B. Real Time Bargaining. Let S = [0, 1] ∪ {Y, N } be the set of the available actions when players 'speak', where x ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the unit pie offered to the other player, and the response is Y = 'yes' or N = 'no'. The vector time domain is T = [0, ∞)×N. For any (t, k) ∈ T , the first component t refers to the real time, and k the artificial time at any real moment t. That is, the second component k counts the number of events that occur at a moment in time, and increments whenever players reply instantaneously, thereby 'stopping the clock'. Let denote the natural strict lexicographic order on T , namely, (t, k) (t , k ) if t > t or t = t and k > k . Let be the corresponding weak order.
A path is a countable subset h ⊂ {1, 2} × S × T satisfying the following conditions. Each element (i, s, (t, k) ) ∈ h is an event, where i denotes the player acting, s the action he takes, and (t, k) the vector time. If (i, s, (t, k) ) ∈ h and k > 1, then there are k − 1 preceding events at time t in h, namely (i , s , (t, ) ) ∈ h, = 1, . . . , k − 1; further, s ∈ [0, 1] for each odd , s = N for each even , and i 2j−1 = i 2j . If h contains an infinite sequence of events at time t, then the first event after t (if there is one) must correspond to an offer. Let P denote the set of paths.
C. Histories. For paths
A history is a path that ends in some finite real time, and thereby belongs to H = {h ∈ P | T 1 (h) < ∞}. A history h ∈ H has a last event if there exists an element (i, s, (t, k) ) ∈ h where (t, k) = (T 1 (h), T 2 (h)). We distinguish histories with 'last events' from those without one.
We partition H into five sets. First, histories in H i have a standing offer by player i. Thus,
By definition, when T 2 (h) < ∞ is odd, the last event (i, s, (T 1 (h), T 2 (h))) corresponds to an offer; i.e., s ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, when T 2 (h) < ∞ is even, the last event corresponds to a response s ∈ {Y, N }. The set of all histories where the last offer has just been accepted is H Y . Similarly, H N consists of the null history and all histories ending in a rejected offer. Finally,
denotes all other histories with no last event. Specifically, there are two types of histories h ∈ H + . First, there may be clustering in time: h may 'end' in a deadlock at a moment in time with T 2 (h) = ∞; so there is a sequence of events {(i n , s n , (T 1 (h), n)), n ∈ N}, with s n = N for all n even. Second, h may have a right cluster point, ending in a sequence of events {(i n , s n , (t n , k n )), n ∈ N}, where t n ↑ T 1 (h) < ∞. The appendix shows that there are no left cluster points.
D. Actions and Strategies. As usual, a strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) will be a map from H into an action set. We imagine that at each decision node, a player is called upon either to approve a tabled offer, or to submit his instructions (in an envelope to his bargaining agent) about when and what he will offer next. The action set A i (h) of player i at h described below reflects the facts that (a) he cannot speak if he has just tendered an offer, or if the game has ended; (b) he must reply if an offer has just been tendered to him; (c) otherwise, once an offer has been rejected, he must plan to propose an offer x ∈ [0, 1] after some elapse time in [0, ∞] , possibly immediately or never (zero or infinite elapse time); but (d) it is not feasible to propose an offer at the current moment (zero elapse time) after a deadlock, where there has been no last event.
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Altogether,
In light of this action space, we call histories h ∈ H j reply nodes, and histories h ∈ H N ∪H + offer nodes. Then a strategy is a map σ on H such that
Hereafter, for any set X (where the topology is understood from context), denote by B(X) the collection of Borel measurable subsets of X, and by ∆(X) the collection of probability measures on (X, B(X)). A behaviour strategy σ is a profile of mixtures
E. Histories Generated from Strategies. We now define the outcome path h σ ∈ P generated by a strategy profile σ. A naive method to construct h(σ) is to start with the null history, and then (possibly forever) sequentially append the 'next event' associated with σ(h) to the current history h; however, this is not possible because of the existence of deadlocks and right real limit points. For example, this construction method will never advance the real time past any deadlock.
For
. For any path h ∈ P, we define a successor path ψ σ (h) determined from h by the strategy profile σ. There are three cases:
In the first case, there's a standing offer by j ∈ {1, 2}, and i must respond at once. In the second case, the game has ended or bargaining lasts forever, since for any real time, there is always a next offer. The third case may be hardest to digest. It considers two possibilities with no offer on the table. First, both players may decide never to speak again. Alternatively, one or more players may plan to propose in finite time; if the offer is immediate, then only the artificial time advances. As an arbitrary tie-breaking rule, if both players speak simultaneously, we assume that only player 1 is heard. For any h ∈ P and (t, k)
Observe that h (t,k) = ∅ if h contains no events weakly before (t, k). Fix a pure strategy σ. An arbitrary path h ∈ P may be inconsistent with σ as it may contain events that are not generated by σ. For example, it may be that σ(∅) = ((x 1 , 10), (x 2 , 20)), so that the offer by player 1 will arrive first. Then, any history h containing events before time 10 is incompatible with σ. Accordingly, let us define A behavior strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium
) is a best reply to σ j at h. Obviously, absent compactness and continuity arguments, best responses may not exist, and hence an SPE may not either; however, below we explicitly construct examples of SPE in the special class of equilibria we study.
The Aspirational Refinement
Our continuous-time model has a myriad of equilibria. We now introduce an equilibrium refinement motivated by earlier psychological studies.
'Exponential' Offer Times
We first argue that the proper subgame after an offer node h is formally equivalent to the original game, assuming we reset the clock. For this, we introduce a forward time-shift operator Υ (t,k) . For all h ∈ H and vector time (τ, ), let
Let h be an offer node and put (τ, ) = T (h). We now define the history form by h "followed" by h . If = ∞, then redefine (τ, ) = (τ, 1) and in addition require that the first event in h occurs after a positive elapse time. Then h ∪ Υ (τ, ) (h ) concatenates the prior history h with the new history h . Thus for any offer node h, and any h ∈ H, define
Given an offer node h and t > 0, let π(σ|h, t) denote the expected payoff vector of following σ after history h (discounted from time T 1 (h) + t), given that no intervening event has occurred after h in [T 1 (h),
The properties of an SPE that we assume here are:
are independent mixtures over offers and elapse times. Also, for all offer nodes h, x ∈ [0, 1] and t ≥ 0, the probability
A2. Payoff-time stationarity: For all offer nodes h, the expected value π i (σ|h, t) is independent of t ∈ co(supp(σ t j (h))). A3. Meaningful offers: Equilibrium offers are accepted with positive probability, and players neither accept the offer x = 0 nor make the offer x = 1.
Action-time independence asserts an independent randomization over offers and time. This deserves some justification. Though, as explained earlier, we have chosen a countably discrete extensive form to represent the game, we still wish to admit the possibility that players may reassess their strategies at any point in real time. Consider a discrete time bargaining game where in every period a player randomizes over silence and making an offer, assuming the other player doesn't propose first. That this randomization is independent across periods is the analogue of our time stationarity assumption. The standard difficulties with assuming a continuum of independent randomizations on in real time was another reason for our choice of extensive form.
Payoff-time stationarity asserts that expected values can only be affected by proposal events. For instance, this rules out time serving as an additional coordination device, affording a focus on simple stationary strategies: It will not be an equilibrium that one player offer x = 3/4 at time t = 5.43, lest the other player receive the whole pie. Thus, we insist that i's expected value remain constant as long as it is possible that j makes an offer (the support restriction). For the convex hull proviso, we have in mind, following A1, strategies where player j randomizes between making an offer or not at every moment.
The assumption of meaningful offers precludes offers serving as payoff-irrelevant babbling. For instance, it may be common knowledge that the first offer must be made and ignored, unless one player fails to send his offer. We rule out accepting the offer x = 0 to preclude certain undesirable SPE in weakly dominated strategies. In particular, ruling out the equilibrium payoff (0, 0) precludes equilibria where both players are supposed to remain silent forever (because λ 1 (v
. Such an equilibrium may be supported by the continuation aspiration values of (1, 0) (or (0, 1)) if player 2 (or player 1) deviates and makes an offer.
Lemma 1 Let σ be an SPE satisfying A1-A3. Then for all offer nodes h, the mixture over offer times has an exponential distribution, say
Proof: For any offer node h, let π 1 (σ| h∪{(2,x,T (h)⊕t) ) be player 1's expected value once player 2 makes the offer (x, 1 − x) at t units of elapsed time after history h. If this is an offer on the equilibrium path, then by A3, there is a positive probability that player 1 will accept it. Since accepting the proposal is an optimal response,
is player 1's expected value immediately after receiving an (equilibrium) offer from player 2 at time T 1 (h) + t, but before having seen its content. Clearly,π 1 (t) does not depend on t, and thus it will be denoted simply byπ 1 . By A3,π 1 > 0.
Let
be the probability that player 2 makes an offer in the time interval [T 1 (h), T 1 (h) + τ ]. We first claim that G 2 (t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0 or G 2 is absolutely continuous, i.e. having no atoms. The case G 2 ≡ 1 is clear because then supp(G 2 ) = {0}. For the rest of the proof assume that G 2 ≡ 1. In this case, we argue that G 2 is absolutely continuous. We have
where
is constant on co(supp(G 2 )). This is impossible if G 2 has an atom at any t ≥ 0, for then
Let g 2 (t) = G 2 (t) be the density function, and λ 2 (t) = g 2 (t)/[1 − G 2 (t)] the corresponding hazard-rate function. Payoff-time stationarity says that π(σ|h, t) =π 1 does not depend on t. Therefore
whether G 2 is absolutely continuous or places all probability mass at 0 (in which case we make λ 2 = ∞).
Aspirational Equilibrium
Given action-time independence, offers are made at a constant rate, and from a timeinvariant offer distribution. We next ask that after any event history, the players' behaviour depends exclusively on their current expected values.
A4. Action-payoff stationarity: π(σ|
Action-payoff stationarity is the primary basis for our aspirational refinement of SPE. It essentially asserts that the players' strategies are functions of their expected payoffs, or aspirations, in the bargaining game.
We shall show that an SPE obeying A1-A4 has a very simple Markovian structure. To this end, consider a tuple (v 0 , λ, µ, α, ρ) , where 
, λ, µ, α, ρ) has a simple recursive structure which we now exploit. LetH N ≡ {h ∈ H N | h is finite}. After any history h ∈H N , the continuation strategy profile σ| h is another APσ (v, λ, µ, α, ρ) with the same structure but a different initial state
So far, our definition of the AP σ =σ(v 0 , λ, µ, α, ρ) only specifies players' actions after finite histories, and thus is incomplete. To finish the definition of σ, we must specify actions after infinite histories (i.e., cluster points and deadlocks) as well. For our purposes, we can prescribe arbitrary behavior after infinite histories if such histories occur with probability 0 in an SPE σ. In that case we can pick an arbitrary v * ∈ A and define σ| h =σ(v * , λ, µ, α, ρ) for all histories h ∈ H + . Thus, if the infinite history h contains multiple cluster points, the continuation strategy σ| h corresponds to the continuation strategy ofσ (v * , λ, µ, α, ρ) along h since the last cluster point. But if σ produces cluster points with positive probability, the extension to infinite histories cannot be arbitrary.
Fix σ and a history h. A time t ∈ [0, T 1 (h)] is critical if h has a cluster point or a deadlock at t (that is, there are infinitely many bargaining events in the interval (t − , t], for all > 0). By definition, a history h ∈ H + ends at a critical time T 1 (h).
A strategy profile σ coincides with an APσ(v (v, λ, µ, α, ρ) (h ) for all finite histories h . Next, for an arbitrary strategy profile σ, let A (σ) denote the set of its continuation values (on and off outcome path). Formally,
Throughout the paper, for brevity, we shorten the above phrase to σ is an AĒ σ (v 0 , λ, µ, α, ρ) , suppressing the last proviso.
Proof: Let σ be an SPE obeying A1-A4. We first define (v 0 , λ, µ, α, ρ) . For each offer history h, let v = π(σ| h ). Given A1-A3, Lemma 1 asserts that players' offer times follow exponential distributions, with parametersλ 1 ,λ 2 . Put λ i (v) =λ i , for i = 1, 2. By assumption A1, the offer distribution σ
Given the atomless exponential distribution of proposal times, in equilibrium, we ignore ties and instantaneous offers, as they almost surely do not occur (and so do not affect expectations).
Assume that after the offer history h, player i proposes first. For any offer x i he makes at time 1) ) be the chance that j accepts such offer, where γ = σ| h . By A4, γ depends on h only through v = π(σ| h ), so α j is well defined. Moreover, for such an offer, define the tail history
Fix an offer history h, and let t * be its last critical point (t *
= 0 if h has no critical points). Decompose h into h
. Hence, v = π(σ(v, λ, µ, α, ρ) ).
). Hence, after the offer is made, player i's continuation value is x j , and thus x j ≥ v i . We now show that
For (c), let x j ∈ [0, 1] be an offer (possibly off-path) for which α i (v, x j ) ∈ (0, 1). Since i randomizes between accepting and rejecting x j , i must be indifferent. That is, the expected value of rejecting x j must equal
, and let σ = σ (0, λ, µ, α, ρ) . By definition, σ must be the continuation strategy in the proper subgame after some history h ∈H N . When players follow σ , if player 1, say, makes any positive offer x 1 (in any finite time), we have α 2 (0, x 1 ) = 0 -for otherwise π 1 (σ ) > 0. So any such offer must be off the equilibrium path. That is, σ must require that neither player makes an offer in finite time. But, for player 2 to be willing to reject such an offer x 1 , it must be that his continuation value after rejection is no less than x 1 , and for player 1 not to gain from making such an offer, his continuation value must remain equal to 0. Thus the continuation strategy must deliver the allocation (0, 1) in finite time with positive probability. This requires that with positive probability, at some future time, either player 2 offers x 2 = 0 and player 1 accepts or player 1 offers x 1 = 1. Both alternatives contradict A3.
It is important to understand when the offer frequency rates λ implied by an AE can vanish or explode. 
Proof:
After any such history, the optimality conditions for player i are equivalent to (a) he is indifferent between waiting and making an offer; (b) he cannot affect his expected value by making any equilibrium offer, and cannot improve his expected value by deviating; (c) after rejecting x, he expects no less than x if he is required to reject x with positive probability, and no more than x if he is required to accept x with positive probability. Condition (a) implies that
This proves (1). Next, any offer x is accepted by j with probability α j (v, x) , and when it is rejected, i's aspiration value drops to ρ ji (v, x) . Condition (b) trivially is equivalent to (2). Finally, (3) follows directly from (c).
Consider an AE σ that coincides withσ(v 0 , λ, µ, α, ρ) satisfying all the assumptions of Theorem 2, except that λ j (v) = 0 for some v ∈ A (σ). Let h be an offer node such that v = π(σ| h ). In this case, after h, player j makes no offers, and thus player i need not be indifferent between waiting and making an offer. Therefore, no restriction onμ j (v) is required and condition (1) may be violated. Similarly, since player j makes no offers, α i (v, x) and ρ ij (v, x) are not required to satisfy (2) (with players i and j switched) for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Nevertheless, since player j may deviate and make an offer, we still must impose that
We now address the opposite case where λ i = ∞. Lemma 2 tells us that this forces the current aspiration value v to satisfy v 1 + v 2 = 1. Checking the conditions of Theorem 2, it is easy to see that immediate agreement on any point on the Pareto frontier is an AE. Our theory only provides interesting implications for AE with delay. We therefore hereafter assume that v (1), while (2) asserts that i's expected continuation value upon offering is his current value v i . In other words, the payoff to waiting exceeds that of offering. Players are thus engaged in a sequence of wars of attrition until agreement. We have a proposer disadvantage, unlike the hard-wired proposer advantage with temporal monopoly.
This yields a simple testable implication on bargaining:
Corollary 2 (Consecutive Offers) If a player makes consecutive equilibrium offers, then his second offer is strictly more generous to the other player. If players i, j make sequential offers x i and x j , then j offers i less than i offered himself:
Proof: After player i makes a proposal that is rejected, the new aspiration value shifts down for player i, and up to x i for player j. Now apply part (a) of Corollary 1. 
satisfies all these properties. In addition, this function has a symmetric graph G (ϕ) (so the associated σ is "symmetric").
. In a κ-concession rule, each player concedes a fixed fraction κ ∈ (0, 1] of the surplus whenever he makes an offer. That is, when the current aspiration vector is v ∈ G (ϕ) player i makes the following offer with probability 1:
.
(The definition of α j (v, x) can easily be modified to strictly punish player i for deviant offers.) Then one can easily verify that for all v 
The Exploding Proposal Rate
We now consider the boundary behavior of the proposal rates λ i . Work by Perry and Reny (1993) , Sakovics (1993) , and Stahl (1993) showed that imposing a boundedly positive delay time between offers forces an offeror advantage; the reason is that one is forced to burn a boundedly positive fraction of the pie by declining. It's instructive to see that this is not a feature of our model. Clearly, it's easy to see that offer rates cannot be boundedly finite across all subgames. In fact, we show that they must explode in some subgames. To see this, we first argue that either the "extreme points" of A ρ (v 0 ) are on the Pareto frontier (as with the κ-concession rule), or the distance from A ρ (v 0 ) to the Pareto frontier is 0.
Lemma 3 (Extreme Aspiration Vectors) Let σ be an AE andv
Proof: WLOG, let i = 2. By contradiction, assume that there exists > 0 such that
Then, by the definition ofv 2 , there exists v ∈ A (σ) such that v 1 < 1 −v 2 and v 2 <v 2 . Suppose that v is the current aspiration vector and player 1 makes an offer x ∈ (v 2 , 1 − v 1 ) (possibly out of equilibrium). If α 2 (v, x) = 1, then player 1's final payoff is 1 − x > v 1 , and player 1 can increase his expected payoff by making the offer x immediately, a contradiction. But if α 2 (v, x) < 1, then player 2 must expect a continuation value at least x >v 2 . That is, there must exist w ∈ A (σ) such that w 2 >v 2 , contradicting the definition ofv 2 . 
converges in probability to a point mass at 1−y. By condition (1) of an AE (in Theorem 2)
If 1 − y = 0, this implies that lim v→w λ 1 (v) = +∞. Similarly, as v ∈ A (σ) approaches w, µ 2 (v) must approach y, and from condition (1) again we have
If y = 0, this implies that lim v→w λ 2 (v) = +∞.
That is, as a player's aspiration value converges to the lowest possible payoff he will ever get in any AE, he makes offers at an increasingly unbounded pace. If y ∈ (0, 1), when the aspiration vector v is near the Pareto frontier and the surplus 1 − v 1 − v 2 is close to 0, then both players make offers very often. When y = 0 (resp. y = 1), the conclusion only applies to player 1 (resp. 2). Recall that for the AE σ specified by a κ-concession rule and the idempotent function ϕ(
Thus, this σ provides an example where λ 2 (v) but not λ 1 (v) tends to ∞ as v → (1, 0).
Example 2 (Battle of the Sexes): Suppose that on the equilibrium path, the players are engaged in a war of attrition to first propose the pie split among (2/3, 1/3) and (1/3, 2/3) most favourable to the other player. (Think of this as a method of deciding which pure equilibrium to play in a Battle of the Sexes.) By Theorem 2, this is an AE with v 0 = (1/3, 1/3) provided r 2 = λ 1 and r 1 = λ 2 . But A (σ) must contain more than just v 0 , since player i can always make offers such as x = 1/2. The simplest aspiration set is A (σ) = {(1/3, 2/3), (1/3, 1/3), (2/3, 1/3)} -where following any offer by i, the aspiration value immediately reverts to j's favoured outcome. For v ∈ {(1/3, 2/3), (2/3, 1/3)}, at least one offer rate must be infinite to ensure immediate agreement.
We now ask whether an AE can have a proposal rate explosion at an aspiration vector v that is not on the Pareto frontier. We now show this can occur provided there are cluster points.
Example 3: Assume for simplicity that r 1 = r 2 = 1 and v 0 = (3/8, 3/8). Consider the function ϕ : (1/4, 1/2) → (1/4, 1/2) defined by ϕ(x) = 3/4 − x. We construct σ so that A (σ) = G (ϕ) ∪ {(1/4, 3/4), (1/2, 1/2), (3/4, 1/4)}.
is a degenerate distribution with all its mass atμ i (v) . In this range, definē
When v ∈ {(1/4, 1/2), (1/2, 1/4)}, we close the definition of σ as in the above 'Battle of Sexes' example, continuing to (1/4, 3/4) or (1/2, 1/2) from (1/4, 1/2), and to (1/2, 1/2) or (3/4, 1/4) from (1/2, 1/4).
As ), each player has a well-defined aspiration level v i (t) between offer events. Moreover, if an offer transpires at time t, then let v i (t) be the expected value of player i immediately after the proposal is tendered, but before its content is heard, andv i (t) just after the content is heard and the reply is given. (Definev i (t) = v i (t) at all other times.)
We now wish to assert that the realizations e −r i t v i (t) constitute a martingale until the players reach an agreement at time τ (v 0 ). But to ensure a genuine stochastic process defined without termination, we create the following artificial true stochastic process, which is constant starting at time τ (v 0 ): Let
The processz i (t) is likewise defined, usingv(t) instead.
Lemma 4 Let σ be an AEσ(v

, λ, µ, α, ρ). The stochastic processes z i (t) andz i (t) are martingales. The aspiration process v(t) is a strict submartingale until agreement time τ .
For an intuition of the martingale, either player is indifferent about offering, since he expects his value back by waiting and never offering (the proposee advantage). Of course, the final agreement time may owe to either player proposing, and so conditional on actually getting proposed to, the expected discounted value exceeds the current value. The proof shows that this surplus over the martingale is exactly balanced by the loss in the event that a player ends up as proposer.
Proof of Lemma 4: Fix t ∈ (0, ∞). First consider the z i (t) process. Let θ i ≥ 0 be the time to the first (hypothetical) offer by player i (i.e., the realization of σ t i (∅)). Let τ k ≥ 0 be the time to the k-th offer event. Defining a ∧ b ≡ min{a, b}, we thus have τ 1 = θ 1 ∧ θ 2 . Almost surely, the number of offers in [0, t] is finite, and hence t = lim k→∞ t ∧ τ k . Then by the Dominated Convergence Theorem, (0)]. Then by the strong Markov property,
and thus by induction,
} is a partition of the states of the world. Since θ 1 and θ 2 are independent exponential random variables,
, where λ 0 = λ 1 + λ 2 . Therefore
Further, we have the conditional expectations 
Finally, for the processz i (t) we only need to observe that by (1) and (2) 
of Theorem 2, E[z(t)|z(t)] = z(t), and therefore E[z(t)|z(0)
as well. Finally, the discounted martingale implies the un-discounted submartingale.
We have just provided a sense in which bargaining 'progresses' in the aspiration space domain: The longer players bargain, the higher the expected sum of aspiration values.
Since values constitute a submartingale, they must almost surely converge by the martingale convergence theorem. But being generated by an AP, they are a Markov process; accordingly, any limit value v must be stationary under this process. But the only almost surely stationary aspiration values are on the Pareto frontier. The next result is also a corollary to Lemma 4.
Theorem 4 Let σ be an AEσ(v
. By the Optional Stopping Theorem, With the previous corollary, the longer bargaining lasts, the lower is the lower bound on the expected duration of bargaining. This yields a simple implication about observables. Proof: Indeed, after the first offer is rejected, v 2 = x 1 . After the second offer, v 1 = x 2 and v 2 drops below x 1 . Thus, v 1 + v 2 ≤ x 1 + x 2 . Now apply Theorem 4.
So less generous alternating offers imply a longer expected bargaining duration.
Relating Offer Rates, Offers, and Acceptance Rates
Content versus Timing of Offers. As players delay, they essentially bargain over the remaining surplus (1 − v 1 − v 2 ). We denote the fraction of surplus player i concedes by offer x in an AE by
Rewrite the delay IC equation (1) as
To wit, holding constant the aspiration values, the rate λ j that any player j offers must vary inversely with the expected fraction of surplus in the pieκ j that he concedes. Ceteris 8 This same two-step logic was used in the learning model of Smith and Sørensen (2000) . 9 This also implies that if r 1 = r 2 = r, then v paribus, if i is anticipating a more generous offer, then he expects to wait a longer period of time. Finally, the pair of equations (4) yields a simple formula for the aspiration value:
This provides insights into the nature of bargaining power, envisioned as the ability to extract an uneven pie split. With temporal monopoly, there are two exogenous sources of asymmetry: relative impatience levels, and the offering order. In our aspirational paradigm, the latter is not present, but there is a strategic component to bargaining power that serves as a stochastic source of asymmetry. Parties gain strength here from their refusal to bargain. As is so often true in social bargaining, one may gain advantage by giving the other party the "silent treatment", forcing them to make all overtures.
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Acceptance Rates. The role of acceptance rates on equilibrium behaviour can only be fully understood if the aspiration set is more narrowly prescribed. But the mere fact that rejection values are positive affords some coarse incentive compatibility conditions. Indeed, using equations (2), (4), and (1),
There are some simple implications of the inequalities (6): Holding constant players' offers and acceptance rates, players cannot delay too much. For instance, if offers are accepted at least half the time, and players propose equal surplus splits (κ 1 = κ 2 = 1/2), then players must offer at a rate greater than his partner's interest rate. Holding constant the frequency and content of offers, players cannot accept too frequently.
Bargaining and the Aspiration Set
Our framework is quite general so far, both mathematically and behaviourally. Since we have motivated our refinement by the behavioural importance of aspirations, we shall add some plausible assumptions linked to this notion. This will allow us to deduce stronger implications of our theory. This section introduces assumptions that lead to simpler aspiration sets A (σ). Specifically, we shall reduce A (σ) to a one-dimensional set: I.e., every vertical (horizontal) line in R An offer x j by j at v ∈ A is admissible if x j ≥ v i . Our refinement treats admissible offers differently than inadmissible ones. As Theorem 2 makes it clear, there is much latitude in making out-of-equilibrium offers unattractive to the proposer. The equilibrium may provide a low continuation value for him (and, possibly, a high value for the responder, higher than the proposal) and/or a low probability of acceptance. For simplicity, we make these issues moot by assuming that inadmissible offers are essentially not heard. More precisely, for any v ∈ A and x j ∈ [0, v i ), we assume that ρ i (v, x j ) = v and α i (v, x j ) = 0. In addition, we now assume that B1. Acceptance Monotonicity. The chance α i (v, x j ) that i accepts j's offer x j is continuous in v and strictly decreasing in v i for all v ∈ A and
Unlike previous assumptions, B1 and B2 include both on and off the equilibrium path restrictions. For example, B2 says that after an admissible offer is rejected, the proposer's continuation value is the same regardless whether the offer is an equilibrium offer or not.
Lemma 5 Assumptions B1 and B2 imply that A (σ) is one-dimensional. In particular, there exists an interval W ⊂ [0, 1] and a strictly decreasing and continuous function
Thus, at v, player j can instantaneously increase his expected value by offering x j . This is a contradiction.
Suppose
Indeed, if w were in this intersection and player 1 made the offer x 1 = v 2 at w, then strong stationarity would imply that ρ 2 (w, 
It is easy to see that if A (σ) is not a decreasing curve, there must exist pairs of points v, v ∈ A (σ) that are "almost" on the same horizontal line. That is, |v 2 − v 2 | is close to 0 and v 1 v 1 . Since α i (v, x j ) is continuous in v, this leads to a contradiction by a similar argument to that above. Therefore, A (σ) is a decreasing and connected curve from (w 1 , 1 − w 1 ) to (1 − w 2 , w 2 ).
With an abuse of notation, for each w ∈ W , we henceforth simply denote, for example,
In his classic text, Zeuthen (1930) assumes that more generous offers are accepted with higher probability. In our model, his assumption is implied by B1-B2.
Lemma 6 Assume B1-B2. If x > x are two equilibrium offers made by
We next give a consistency check between the acceptance rate and expected proposal.
Lemma 7 An AE cannot have a constant acceptance rate and constant fraction of surplus conceded.
Proof: This is a simple geometric result. Notice that 1/κ 1 (v) = 1 + tan θ 1 , where θ 1 is the angle of incline from the aspiration vector v to the expected offer (1 −μ 1 ,μ 1 ). Thus, a constant fraction of surplus conceded is equivalent to a constant angle θ. Along with a constant acceptance rate, this means that the aspiration set A (σ) is inside and parallel to the Pareto frontier. This contradicts the fact that A (σ) must approach the Pareto frontier at the extremes by Lemma 5.
In fact, if the aspiration set A (σ) is convex (more precisely, if ϕ is convex) and offers are pure we can show the following results:
is constant then the corresponding κ j (v) must be increasing in v i .
Sensitivity Analysis
We wish to ask what happens if one party becomes more impatient. Since our bargaining model admits a multiplicity of aspirational equilibria, it is not immediately obvious how to perform such an exercise. Indeed, the AE played may vary with the interest rates (r 1 , r 2 ). But notice that given (1) of Theorem 2, σ(v 0 , λ, µ, α, ρ) is an AE when r = (r 1 , r 2 ) iffσ (v 0 ,λ, µ, α, ρ) is an AE for the interest rate pairr = (r 1 ,r 2 ), whereλ are the corresponding offer ratesλ i = (r j /r j )λ i , i = 1, 2. So given any AE σ, if player j becomes twice as impatient, and player i doubles the rate that he offers in σ, then the new strategŷ σ is an AE. This time-rescaling maintains all incentive conditions. This mapping, holding constant the strategy profile except for the offers rates, allows us to compare the sets of AE for different levels of impatience by simply comparing corresponding equilibria.
Definition 2 Player i's expected pie split is higher with (r 1 ,r 2 ) than with (r 1 , r 2 ) if the expected final split in each AEσ =σ (v 0 ,λ, µ, α, ρ) for (r 1 ,r 2 ) exceeds that of the corresponding AE σ =σ (v 0 , λ, µ, α, ρ) for (r 1 , r 2 ).
We will expand the set of states and view the bargaining process on the equilibrium path as a stochastic process, where agreement corresponds to absorption on the Pareto frontier. With each w ∈ int(W ) we identify two states, w Below, we will exploit the fact that our bargaining process is really a mixture of the two artificial processes where only one of the players i = 1, 2 makes all the offers. Indeed, (w, B) , resp.) be the chance that from an initial state w ∈ W , the next period's state is a transient (absorbing) state in B ∈ B(W ), when player i makes all the offers (that is, when we set λ j ≡ 0). Then,
for all w ∈ W and B ∈ B(W ). The bargaining stochastic process is described by the following transition probability functions M (w, B) , i.e. the probability that from an initial state w ∈ W , next period's state is a transient state in B in our actual bargaining process. This transition probability depends on both the random offers and the acceptance chances.
For our next result we need to strengthen the war of attrition property and the assumption A3 on meaningful offers.
B3. War of Attrition in Offers. For any
B4. Acceptance Positivity: Equilibrium offers are accepted with boundedly positive probability α > 0.
As previously noted, the players are engaged in a war of attrition in terms of expected continuation values; assumption B3 requires that the war of attrition holds (weakly) in terms of the immediate expected offers (i.e. ignoring rejection values). Written in the formμ i (v) ≥ 1 −μ j (v), it has the following interpretation. At any v ∈ A ρ (v 0 ), the offer by i to j is more generous to j than what j would offer himself. That is, in terms of the next offer alone, it is always better to let your opponent speak first.
Assumption A3 requires that equilibrium offers be always accepted with positive probability. Even though v 1 + v 2 < 1 for all v ∈ A ρ (v K(w, B) is the probability that when the process starts at the transient state w, it enters the set absorbing states (for the first time) at some state in B. For any kernel K ∈ K, letK(w) = W xK(w, dx) be the expected absorbing state when the process starts at the bargaining state w ∈ W . For any two kernels K 1 , K 2 ∈ K, write K 1 K 2 ifK 1 (w) ≤K 2 (w) for all w ∈ W . The poset (K, ) is a complete lattice.
We hereafter fix the interest rates r = (r 1 , r 2 ), andr = (r 1 ,r 2 ), and corresponding λ, µ, α, ρ) . We assumer 1 /r 1 >r 2 /r 2 , so that γ(w) > γ(w) for all w ∈ W . Let Q (resp.Q) be the kernel corresponding to the stochastic process generated by the AE σ (resp.σ). We now show that contrary to the Rubinstein bargaining model, player 1's expected pie split is higher when he is more impatient.
Theorem 5 Assume an AE satisfying B1-B4. Ifr i /r i >r j /r j , the expected pie split is higher for player i with interest ratesr than with r. That is, Q Q .
for each K ∈ K, where
for each w ∈ W and B ∈ B(W ). The stochastic kernel Q satisfies the standard equation Q(w, B) = Ψ(Q)(w, B) for all w ∈ W and B ∈ B. Similarly,Q is a fixed point of the mapΨ defined usingγ in place of γ.
Step
Proof of
Step 1: By Tarski's fixed point theorem,Q = sup {K | K Ψ (K)} Q.
By
Step 1, since Q = Ψ(Q), it suffices to show that Ψ(Q) Ψ (Q). We have
for all w ∈ W and B ∈ B(W ). Since γ(w) <γ(w) for each w ∈ W , Ψ(Q) Ψ (Q) is satisfied iff Ψ 1 (Q) Ψ 2 (Q). So we must prove that (regardless of the initial bargaining state) player 1 gets a larger expected share from the stochastic process where player 2 makes all offers than from the one with roles reversed.
Let L be the space of functions K : 
Step 2 K is a closed subset of L and Ψ : L → L is a contraction.
Proof of
Step 2: Appendicized.
We projected the aspiration set A ρ (v 0 ) into the horizontal axis to construct the onedimensional bargaining state space W . Alternatively, since ϕ is strictly decreasing, we could have projected A ρ (v 0 ) into the vertical axis to produce a "dual" state space
and B ⊂ B(W ). When player 2 has an initial aspiration value w, player 1 has the initial aspiration value ϕ −1 (w), and player 2's final share is in B iff player 1's share is in e(B). Thus, K * (w, B) represents the probability that when player 2's expected value is w, his share in the final split is in the set B.
Step 3 LetK be the set of kernels
. Then the fixed point Q of Ψ belongs toK.
Step 3:K is closed subset of L . Hence, by Step 2, it is enough to show that Ψ(K) ∈K for all K ∈K.
Note that ϕ −1 (w) is the new bargaining state when player 1 makes the admissible offer w and player 2 rejects it. Fix K ∈K and denote J = Ψ(K). We first show that J satisfies constraint (i) above. We have
, by (2) in Theorem 2, and because supp(µ 2 (w)) ⊂ [w, 1] (soμ 2 (w) ≥ w) by Theorem 2. A symmetric argument shows that J also satisfies (ii). Therefore, Q ∈K.
Step 4 Properties (i) and (ii) imply
Step 4: Pick any K ∈K and as before denote J i = Ψ i (K), i = 1, 2. Since the sum of the players' expected final shares cannot exceed 1, player 2's expected share starting at w ∈W cannot exceed 1 −K(w). By (ii), this expected share is at least ϕ(w) (since the aspiration value of w for player 1 corresponds to the aspiration value ϕ(w) for player 2).
Since Q ∈K, we have Ψ 1 (Q) Ψ 2 (Q), and therefore Q Q , as required.
Conclusion
Literature Reprise. Without a doubt, the principle theme of the pre-1970 literature (essentially, everything but Nash's work) is bargaining as a concession game. The fixation on the concession idea was hard-wired into the action space, and likely blinded economists to the simple offer-accept/decline structure. Indeed, in his summary of the state of knowledge on the bargaining problem, Coddington (1968) amazingly formalizes the bargaining problem as "represented quite generally by . . . (1) a pair of variables q 1 , q 2 representing the demands of the bargainers at any point in time."
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Transcending this restrictive action space was a key contribution of Ståhl (1972) .
Given impatience as the force for early settlement, and the view of bargaining as a concession game together argue for the importance of the war of attrition. Osborne's (1985) game was a simple example of a war of attrition bargaining game. Others (eg. Abreu and Gul (2000) and Abreu and Pearce (1999) ) have incomplete information wars of attrition. We believe, however, that ours is the first to analyze the complete information bargaining game with unrestricted offers and deduce the war of attrition property.
The strongest contrast between our model and Osborne's is simply that our model is not a concession game. As in Rubinstein (1982) , we have assumed that exploding offers imply no future commitment: Bygones are bygones.
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For instance, if Abreu and Pearce (1999) were not a concession game, then after a player concedes the remaining unconceded unit, he might well have his proposal rejected. One may motivate this assumption by simplicity, for otherwise the problem is no longer stationary in aspiration space: This captures the realistic inherent risk of declining any offer: One may ultimately offer or accept a strictly worse outcome. Accepting an offer is the irreversible decision to exercise an option, and spurning one is very much a risky decision not to sell an asset. If offers imply irrevocable commitments, some sort of third party commitment technology is required to enforce equilibria where the players progressively concede parts of the bargaining pie. There is an additional state variable to the problem, namely one's best outstanding (and last) offer to the other player, which complicates the analysis. Still, this is an obvious and promising avenue for future work, and we hope that our work will be seen as an instructive step towards this goal.
Summary. We have provided a new formalization of continuous time games, and then introduced and analyzed a behaviourally-based refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium. This has yielded a theory of bargaining with some intuitive aspects of bargaining absent from the temporal monopoly theory: a war of attrition endogenously arises; all offers are concessions; offers are declined, disappointing the proposer. A martingale structure framework yields immediate bounds on the duration of bargaining. Most crucially, our refinement yields an inverted strategic role of the proposer, no longer strength but weakness. This in turn reverses the comparative static with respect to impatience. Our proof develops a way of performing sensitivity analysis (i.e. 'comparative statics', but for a dynamic system) for the final distribution of a Markov process with absorbing states. Our methodology is sufficiently general that it should be applicable in other contexts. For any time t 1 ∈ R + let
The supremum in the definition of θ(t 1 ) is always attained. For example, if there is a cluster point in real time at θ 1 (t 1 ), then there exists a sequence {ĥ n } ⊂ H t 1 (σ) with T 1 (ĥ n ) ↑ θ 1 (t 1 ). In this case, the supremum is n∈Nĥ n ∈ H t 1 (σ). And if there is a deadlock at θ 1 (t 1 ), then there is a sequence {ĥ Claim 4 For all h ∈ H, either ψ σ (h) =h, or the last event of ψ σ (h) is at time t 1 > T 1 (h).
Next, call y ∈ R a left limit point of a subset Y ⊆ R if y = lim n→∞ y n for some sequence {y n ∈ Y |y n > y}. Claim 4 implies that there are no left limit points of h T 1 .
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13 If we similarly define a right limit point, then we likewise have that if t is a right limit point of h T 1 , then there is no (i, s, t) ∈ h with t 1 = t .
A.2 Proof of Step 2 for Theorem 5
Step 5 for each ξ ∈ V and B ∈ B(W ). Consider instead V with the weak- * topology. It is easy to see that Φ is continuous when V has this topology. Indeed, suppose that {ξ n } ⊂ V is such that ξ n → ξ in the weak- * topology. That is, f, ξ n → f, ξ for all f ∈ L ∞ (W ), where, for example, 
